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ABSTRACT 
Anti-immigration and anti-Islam rhetoric has become part of political discourse. This 
raises questions about, on the one hand, politicians’ freedom of expression and, on the 
other hand, the duty not to be gratuitously offensive. How can these two be reconciled? 
Can and should political speech be curtailed for being (gratuitously) offensive? If so, 
where does this leave a politician’s right to freedom of expression? These questions are 
the main focus of this article and the case law of the European Court Human Rights will 
be used in the analysis.  
I INTRODUCTION 
In many European countries, anti-immigration and anti-Islam rhetoric has become part 
of political discourse and many politicians have become more outspoken in their 
criticism of Islam and Muslims, as they see Islam as a religion which is incompatible 
with the values of a Western democratic society and thus Muslims as a threat to that 
society. This rhetoric has become even more vociferous after the events at the French 
magazine Charlie Hebdo and the recent terrorist attacks in Paris, Brussels and Nice. 
Marine Le Pen in France and Geert Wilders in the Netherlands are good examples of 
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politicians using such rhetoric. When challenged, these politicians invoke their right to 
freedom of speech1 and defend their expressions by saying that they raise concerns 
which exist among many people in their country. Some of these politicians have been 
prosecuted and convicted for incitement to hatred on the grounds of race, ethnicity or 
religion. They have taken their cases to the European Court of Human Rights and 
claimed a violation of their freedom of expression under article 10 of the European 
Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (ECHR). 
The Court2 thus had to assess whether the convictions interfered with the politician’s 
freedom under article 10 and, if so, whether this was justified. 
Freedom of expression is a fundamental human right guaranteed by all major 
human rights instruments, including the ECHR. This right applies not only to 
expressions that are favourably received but also to those that offend, shock or disturb. 
The right also appears to protect expressions criticizing and denouncing religions and 
beliefs. But the right to freedom of expression is not an absolute right. Article 10(2) 
ECHR allows for restrictions under certain circumstances for, among other aims, 
security and safety, the prevention of disorder and the protection of the rights of others. 
The European Court of Human Rights has always stressed the importance of the 
right to freedom of expression for a democratic society. The freedom is particularly 
important for politicians, and even more so for opposition politicians. The Court has 
afforded a very high level of protection to political speech and will thus scrutinize 
restrictions on such speech very carefully. The Court has also held that politicians can 
use exaggerated and provocative language as a means of getting their message across. 
                                                 
1 In this article, the term ‘freedom of expression’ and ‘freedom of speech’ are used interchangeably.  
2 In the following, the term ‘the Court’ will refer to the European Court of Human Rights. 
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The right to freedom of expression includes the right not only to pass on information, 
but also to receive information and both play an important role in the political and 
public debate because how can a person make up their mind about, for example, who to 
vote for if they cannot get information? 
On the other hand, the European Court of Human Rights has also held, in 
relation to expressions criticizing religions or beliefs and religious believers, that 
gratuitously offensive expressions are not covered by the protection of article 10. But 
what does ‘gratuitously offensive’ mean? In the eye of religious believers, any critique 
of their beliefs will easily be felt to be gratuitously offensive.  
Therefore, on one side is the freedom of expression of politicians, a very 
important good in a democratic society. On the other side is the opinion of the European 
Court of Human Rights that gratuitously offensive speech is not protected by article 10. 
How can these two be reconciled? Can political speech ever be gratuitously offensive? 
Should political speech be curtailed for being (gratuitously) offensive? If so, where does 
this leave a politician’s right to freedom of expression? These questions are the main 
focus of this article and the case law of the European Court of Human Rights will be 
used in the analysis.  
II FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION UNDER THE ECHR 
Article 10 ECHR determines that ‘Everyone has the right to freedom of expression. 
This right shall include freedom to hold opinions and to receive and impart information 
and ideas without interference by public authority and regardless of frontiers. …’ The 
European Court of Human Rights has stressed the importance of this right for the proper 
functioning of a democratic society. In Handyside v United Kingdom, the Court referred 
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to the principles characterizing a democratic society and stated that ‘freedom of 
expression constitutes one of the essential foundations of such a society, one of the 
basic conditions for its progress and for the development of every man’.3  
However, the right to freedom of expression under article 10 is not an absolute 
right as article 10(2) allows for restrictions on the right:  
The exercise of these freedoms, since it carries with it duties and 
responsibilities, may be subject to such formalities, conditions, restrictions or 
penalties as are prescribed by law and are necessary in a democratic society, in 
the interests of national security, territorial integrity or public safety, for the 
prevention of disorder or crime, for the protection of health or morals, for the 
protection of the reputation or rights of others, for preventing the disclosure of 
information received in confidence, or for maintaining the authority and 
impartiality of the judiciary. 
According to the European Court of Human Rights, the words ‘necessary in a 
democratic society’ mean that there must be a pressing social need and this means that 
the interference must be proportionate to the legitimate aim pursued.4 States are better 
placed to assess what is necessary in a democratic society and, therefore, they have a 
certain margin of appreciation to make the initial assessment of the reality of the 
pressing social need implied by the notion of ‘necessity’. However, the European Court 
                                                 
3 Handyside v United Kingdom (1979-1980) 1 E.H.R.R. 737, at [49]. 
4 Ibid. 
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of Human Rights is empowered to give the final ruling.5 If the Court affords states a 
wider margin of appreciation, it will scrutinize a restriction less closely.  
The European Court of Human Rights has consistently held that exceptions to 
the right to freedom of expression in article 10 ‘must be narrowly interpreted and the 
necessity for any restrictions must be convincingly established’.6 Despite this, the 
margin of appreciation is not the same for all types of expressions. This is clear from 
Wingrove v United Kingdom, where the European Court of Human Rights held that, 
under article 10(2), there is little scope for restrictions on political speech and debates of 
public interest, but that the margin of appreciation is wider ‘in relation to matters liable 
to offend intimate personal convictions within the sphere of morals or, especially, 
religion’. This is so because there is no consensus in Europe about the requirements of 
the protection of the rights of others in relation to attacks on their religious convictions 
and because what causes offence varies, ‘especially in an era characterised by an ever 
growing array of faiths and denominations’.7 
Therefore, under article 10(2), restrictions on expressions about moral or 
religious matters will be scrutinized less closely than restrictions on matters contributing 
to the political and public debate. 
                                                 
5 Ibid. at [48] and [49]. 
6 See, for example, Observer and Guardian v United Kingdom (1992) 14 E.H.R.R. 153, at [59]; 
Oberschlick v Austria (No. 2) (1997) 25 E.H.R.R. 357, at [29]; Ceylan v Turkey (2000) 30 E.H.R.R. 73, at 
[32]; Balsyte-Lideikiene v Lithuania (App. No.72596/01), judgment of 4 November 2008, at [75]. 
7 Wingrove v United Kingdom (1997) 24 E.H.R.R. 1, at [58]. This was repeated in a number of later cases, 
see, for example, Murphy v Ireland (2004) 38 E.H.R.R. 13, at [67], Balsyte-Lideikiene v Lithuania, at 
[81]; and, Perinçek v Switzerland, (2016) 63 E.H.R.R. 6, at [197].  
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The European Court of Human Rights has also repeatedly stressed the 
importance of freedom of speech for the public debate and for politicians.8 For example, 
in Lingens v Austria, the Court held that ‘freedom of political debate is at the very core 
of the concept of a democratic society’,9 while in Castells v Spain, it mentioned that 
freedom of expression is especially important for an elected representative of the people 
and for opposition politicians.10 
Moreover, the European Court of Human Rights has explained that politicians 
must be able to canvass for votes and have the right to defend their opinions in public 
and can use offensive, shocking, disturbing language,11 they can use a degree of 
exaggeration and provocation,12 and immoderation13 and be controversial and virulent14  
because of their important contribution to the political and public debate. But this does 
not mean that their freedom of speech can never be restricted, because article 10(2) is 
still applicable. The Court has found restrictions on expressions of politicians to be 
                                                 
8 On the importance of freedom of speech for the public debate, see the conclusion in: P. Noorlander, “In 
Fear of Cartoons”, (2015) 2 E.H.R.L.R. 115, 121. 
9 Lingens v Austria (1986) 8 E.H.R.R. 407, at [42]. See also: Erbakan v Turkey (App. No.59405/00), 
judgment of 6 July 2006, at [55]. 
10 Castells v Spain (1992) 14 E.H.R.R. 445, at [42]. See also: Incal v Turkey (2000) 29 E.H.R.R. 449, at 
[46]. 
11 Féret v Belgium (App. No. 15615/07), judgment of 16 July 2009, at [76] and [77]. 
12 Le Pen v France (App. No. 18788/09), Decision of 20 April 2010. See also on this: D. Voorhoof, 
European Court of Human Rights Jean-Marie Le Pen v. France (2010) < 
http://merlin.obs.coe.int/iris/2010/7/article1.en.html. 
13 Otegi Mondragon v Spain (2015) 60 E.H.R.R. 7, at [54]. 
14 Perinçek  v Switzerland, at [231].  
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compatible with article 10 because these expressions incited to hatred and violence 
against a particular ethnic or religious group.15  
In many European countries, anti-immigration and anti-Islam rhetoric has 
become part of political speech and not only of far right parties. For example, at the 
recent UK conservative party conference, it was said that uncontrolled immigration 
from Europe must be halted because foreigners are taking British jobs. Many politicians 
have also become more vociferous in their criticism of Islam and Muslims and the 
supposed incompatibility of Islam with a Western democratic society. As Sottieaux 
writes, ‘the type of speech at issue in Féret and Le Pen is representative for the current 
anti-immigration and anti-Islam discourse found in many European countries’.16 The 
criticism by politicians has been seen as offensive by the group targeted, often Muslims. 
But should this be a reason to restrict such speech? The following part will address this 
question. 
III (GRATUITOUSLY) OFFENSIVE EXPRESSION 
Barendt writes, ‘the proscription of any type of speech on the ground of its 
offensiveness is, of course, very hard to reconcile with freedom of expression, for a 
right to express and receive only inoffensive opinions would hardly be worth having’.17 
Just being offensive is thus not enough to hold that an expression breached article 10 
                                                 
15 See, for example, Féret v Belgium; and, Le Pen v France. 
16 S. Sottieaux, “”Bad Tendencies” in the European Court of Human Rights’s “Hate Speech” 
Jurisprudence” (2011) 7(1) E.C.L.R. 43. 
17 E. Barendt, “Religious Hatred Laws: Protecting Groups or Belief?” (2011) 17(1) Res Publica, 41, 44. 
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ECHR as the European Court of Human Rights has stated that the right to freedom of 
expression applies  
not only to ‘information’ or ‘ideas’ that are favourably received or regarded as 
inoffensive or as a matter of indifference, but also to those that offend, shock or 
disturb the State or any sector of the population. Such are the demands of that 
pluralism, tolerance and broadmindedness without which there is no ‘democratic 
society’.18 
Moreover, speech criticizing religions or religious believers attracts the protection of 
article 10 because the Court has held that those who choose to exercise the freedom to 
manifest their religion under article 9 ECHR ‘cannot reasonably expect to be exempt 
from all criticism. They must tolerate and accept the denial by others of their religious 
beliefs and even the propagation by others of doctrines hostile to their faith’.19  
Article 9(1) determines that everyone has the right to freedom of thought, 
conscience and religion and that this right includes the freedom to change and to 
manifest one’s religion or belief. The freedom to change one’s religion would be 
meaningless if one could not receive or impart views that criticize or deny the tenets of 
one’s religion or support those of another religion. Therefore, ‘the right to freedom of 
expression implies that it should be allowed to scrutinise, openly debate, and criticise, 
                                                 
18 Handyside v United Kingdom, at [49]. 
19 Otto-Preminger-Institute v Austria (1995) 19 E.H.R.R. 34, at [47]. 
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even harshly and unreasonably, belief systems, opinions and institutions …’.20 So, in a 
democratic society there should be room to criticize and deny religious beliefs even if 
this might be offensive to believers. This holds true for expressions of other (e.g. 
political) beliefs and opinions, but this article focuses on religious expressions.  
Political speech attracts very strong protection under article 10 (2). The term 
‘political speech’ is defined by Barendt as ‘all speech relevant to the development of 
public opinion on the whole range of issues which an intelligent citizen should think 
about’.21 This clearly includes expressions about religion and belief and, therefore, an 
open, democratic society requires that strong protection should be given to expressions 
about religions or beliefs. This is, for Cram, a reason to argue for strong protection of 
speech about Islam, because of ‘the overt desire of certain Islamic groups to attain 
political power so that they might advance their goal of creating a theocratic society’.22  
On the other hand, article 10(2) makes clear that the exercise of the freedom of 
expression brings with it ‘duties and responsibilities’ and the European Court of Human 
Rights has held that  
amongst them - in the context of religious opinions and beliefs - may 
legitimately be included an obligation to avoid as far as possible expressions that 
                                                 
20 European Commission for Democracy through Law (Venice Commission), Report on the Relationship 
between Freedom of Expression and Freedom of Religion: the Issue of Regulation and Prosecution of 
Blasphemy, Religious Insult and Incitement to Religious Hatred (Strasbourg, 2008, Council of Europe, 
Study No. 406/2006, CDL-AD(2008)026), at [49].  
21 E. Barendt, Freedom of Speech (Oxford, Claredon Press, 1985) p. 162. 
22 I. Cram, “The Danish Cartoons, Offensive Expression, and Democratic Legitimacy”, in I. Hare and J. 
Weinstein (eds) Extreme Speech and Democracy (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2009) 311, 323. 
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are gratuitously offensive to others and thus an infringement of their rights, and 
which therefore do not contribute to any form of public debate capable of 
furthering progress in human affairs.23  
This paragraph raises a number of questions. First, what does ‘in the context of religious 
opinions and beliefs’ mean? In the same case, the European Court of Human Rights 
refers to ‘the manner in which religious beliefs and doctrines are opposed or denied’ and 
considers that ‘the respect for the religious feelings of believers as guaranteed in Article 
9 can legitimately be thought to have been violated by provocative portrayals of objects 
of religious veneration’.24 Therefore, the Court appears to give a wide meaning to the 
terms ‘in the context of religious opinions and beliefs’ to include both criticism of 
beliefs and offence to believers. Therefore, politicians’ expressions about Islam and 
Muslims would both be covered. 
The second question raised by the above quote is: what does ‘gratuitously 
offensive’ mean? And who determines this? In the eyes of religious believers, any 
criticism of their beliefs will be seen as gratuitously offensive, but the speaker or author 
will dispute this and claim that they are making a contribution to the public and political 
debate.  
It is submitted that the term ‘gratuitously offensive’, in its everyday meaning 
refers to an expression which is needlessly and unnecessarily offensive and which is 
                                                 
23 Otto-Preminger-Institute v Austria, at [49]. The same or similar expression has been used in other 
cases, see, for example: Wingrove v United Kingdom, at [52]; Gündüz v Turkey (2003) 41 E.H.R.R. 5, at 
[37]; Giniewski v France (2007) 45 E.H.R.R. 589, at [43]. 
24 Otto-Preminger-Institute v Austria, at [47]. 
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made with the sole purpose of causing offence to certain people without serving any 
further purpose. This is supported by what the European Court of Human Rights also 
states in the quote given, that ‘gratuitously offensive’ expressions do not contribute to 
the public debate and/or are not capable of furthering progress in human affairs. And, it 
follows from this that, if a remark contributes to the public debate and/or is capable of 
furthering progress in human affairs, it will not be ‘gratuitously offensive’. Nathwani 
points out that the duty to avoid gratuitously offensive expressions cannot easily be 
reconciled with the right to offend, shock and disturb’ postulated in Handyside v United 
Kingdom’.25 However, she continues that ‘the point is that gratuitously offensive 
expressions might be needed and justified as an expression of dissent or protest against 
a dominant group, ideology or religion’.26 It is suggested that his does not accord with 
what the European Court of Human Rights has said in the case above, as an ‘expression 
of dissent or protest against a dominant group, ideology or religion’ is part of the public 
debate and thus, as such, it would not, in the definition of the Court, be gratuitously 
offensive.  
So, can the duty to avoid gratuitously offensive expressions be reconciled with 
the European Court of Human Rights’ judgment that freedom of expression includes 
expressions that offend, shock or disturb? It is submitted that they can because the Court 
allows offending, shocking, disturbing, exaggerated, provocative and controversial 
                                                 
25 N. Nathwani, “Religious Cartoons and Human Rights – a Critical Legal Analysis of the Case Law of 
the European Court of Human Rights on the Protection of Religious Feelings and its Implications in the 
Danish Affair Concerning Cartoons of the Prophet Muhammad” (2008) 4 E.H.R.L.R. 488, in fn. 44. 
26 Ibid. 
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expressions by politicians if they contribute to the public debate, but it does not allow 
gratuitously offensive comments because they do not do so and because they are not 
capable of furthering progress in human affairs. Therefore, restrictions on expressions 
by politicians that contribute to the public debate should be held to violate the freedom 
of expression of the speaker or author unless some of the circumstances discussed 
below are present. 
Support for this can also be found in the case law of the European Court of 
Human Rights. For example, in Giniewski v France, the Court held that the applicant 
‘had made a contribution, which by definition was open to discussion, to a wide-ranging 
and ongoing debate … without sparking off any controversy that was gratuitous or 
detached from the reality of contemporary thought’.27 And, although the article in 
question contained conclusions and phrases which might offend, shock or disturb some 
people, this did not preclude the enjoyment of freedom of expression. The article was 
not gratuitously offensive or insulting and did not incite to disrespect or hatred. The 
Court thus found a violation of article 10.28  
In Gündüz v Turkey, the applicant had taken part in a television programme and 
was then convicted for incitement to religious hatred because of what he had said in the 
programme. The European Court of Human Rights found that his conviction had 
breached his right to freedom of expression. The Court considered that the applicant 
contributed to a programme on a topic that was widely debated in the Turkish media. 
                                                 
27 Giniewski v France, at [50]. 
28 Ibid. at [52] and [53]. 
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The programme was designed to encourage an exchange of views on the role of religion 
in a democratic society.29 So, again, the programme did contribute to the public debate. 
In Morice v France, the European Court of Human Rights held that, when it 
concerns a matter of public interest, a degree of hostility and the potential seriousness of 
certain remarks do not obviate the right to a high level of protection.30 All this strongly 
suggests that speech is not gratuitously offensive if it contributes to the public debate 
and/or is capable of furthering progress in human affairs. Therefore, the duty to avoid 
gratuitously offensive expressions in Otto-Preminger-Institut v Austria can be 
reconciled with the European Court of Human Rights judgment in Handyside v the UK 
that freedom of expression includes expressions that offend, shock or disturb. 
 It is submitted that politicians who use anti-Islam and anti-Muslim rhetoric are 
contributing to the public debates about immigration, integration and terrorism which 
currently are taking place all across Europe and that they are raising issues that are of 
deep concern to many people in Europe. Therefore, their speech cannot be said to be 
‘gratuitously offensive’ just because it offends, shocks or disturbs Muslims.  
A further problem with the term ‘gratuitously offensive’ is that it is very 
subjective: one person might find something gratuitously offensive while another 
person might find the same expression perfectly acceptable. Leigh points out that 
‘gratuitously offensive speech is a vague category that is unpredictable in its 
                                                 
29 Gündüz v Turkey, at [43] and [44]. 
30 Morice v France (2016) 62 E.H.R.R. 1, at [125]. 
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application’.31  This, according to Cram, confers on the state wide and vaguely defined 
powers to prescribe the manner in which ideas and opinions are expressed’.32 And, 
O’Reilly warns that ‘the European Court of Human Rights should be mindful of the 
difficulty in conceptualising objectively offensive expression, and the potential for the 
imposition of uncertain or unforeseeable standards on individuals’.33  
Therefore, the vagueness, subjectivity and uncertain meaning of the term 
‘gratuitously offensive’ could lead to abuse by the state to suppress the speech of 
politicians and others because of the way this is expressed.  
IV FOSTERING INTOLERANCE 
In Erbakan v Turkey, the leader of a political party had been convicted for incitement to 
hatred and hostility in criminal proceedings more than four years after he had made a 
public speech about distinctions between religions, races and regions. The speech had 
been made in an area that had been subject to terrorist attacks. The European Court of 
Human Rights found that Turkey had violated Erbakan’s right to freedom of expression 
under article 10 ECHR. The Court stated that combating all forms of intolerance was an 
integral part of human rights protection because tolerance and respect for equal dignity 
of all human beings constitute the foundations of a democratic pluralist society.34 
                                                 
31 I. Leigh, “Damned if They Do, Damned if They Don’t: the European Court of Human Rights and the 
Protection of Religion from Attack” (2011) 17(1) Res Publica 55, 71. 
32 Cram, in Hare and Weinstein, 323. 
33 A. O’Reilly, “In Defence of Offence: Freedom of Expression, Offensive Speech, and the Approach of 
the European Court of Human Rights” (2016) 19 Trinity College Law Review, 234, 240. 
34 Erbakan v Turkey, at [56]. 
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Therefore, the Court continued, it may, in principle, be considered necessary in 
democratic societies to sanction or prevent all forms of expression which spread, incite, 
promote or justify hatred based on intolerance, including religious intolerance, provided 
that the formalities, conditions, restrictions or sanctions are proportionate to the 
legitimate aim pursued.35 So these restrictions still have to pass the justification test of 
article 10(2). The Court also held that it was crucially important that, in their public 
speeches, politicians should avoid making comments likely to foster such intolerance.36 
In Féret v Belgium, a politician was convicted of incitement to discrimination 
and hatred. His party had distributed leaflets, written by him, and posters which 
presented non-European migrant communities in Belgium as criminally-minded and 
keen to exploit the Belgian benefit system. The European Court of Human Rights held 
that political speech that stirred hatred based on religious, ethnic or cultural prejudices 
was a threat to social peace and political stability in democratic states and that it was 
crucial for politicians, when expressing themselves in public, to avoid comments that 
might foster intolerance. The conviction was thus held not to interfere with Article 10 
ECHR.37  
Two reasons could be suggested for the different decisions in these two cases. 
First of all, the criminal proceedings against Erbakan were not instituted until more than 
4 years after the speech was made, while there was no such delay in Féret v Belgium. 
Second, Erbakan’s remarks were related to religion and religious believers while Féret’s 
                                                 
35 Ibid. 
36 Ibid. at [64].  
37 Féret v Belgium, at [73] and [75]. 
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remarks appeared to have a racial basis. The European Court of Human Rights might 
have considered the latter more serious for this reason.38 Whether the fact that different 
countries were involved in these cases played a role in the decisions of the Court in is 
unclear.39 
Whatever the reasons for the different outcome in the two cases, the 
considerations of the European Court of Human Rights in both cases suggest that 
politicians also have a duty not to foster intolerance. But what does this mean? It is a 
very vague term which could be open to very different interpretations. In Erbakan v 
Turkey, the Court also considered that ‘it had not been established that at the time of 
Erbakan’s prosecution the speech in question had given rise to, or been likely to give 
rise to, a “present risk” and an “imminent” danger for society’40 and, thus, a violation of 
applicant’s freedom of expression was found. This suggests that combating mere 
intolerance is not sufficient to justify infringing the freedom of expression and that real 
– and not potential - impact on the rights of other needs to be demonstrated. The latter is 
                                                 
38 See on the argument that there is a difference between racial and religious hate speech, for example,  
the following authors: Barendt, “‘Religious Hatred Laws: Protecting Groups or Belief?’, 46; R. Plant, 
“Religion, Identity and Freedom of Expression” 17(1) Res Publica (2011) 7, 12; J. Vrielink, 
“Islamophobia and the Law: Belgian Hate Speech Legislation Speech and the Wilful Destruction of the 
Koran”, 14 (1) International Journal of Discrimination and the Law (2014) 54, 57; O’Reilly, “In Defence 
of Offence: Freedom of Expression, Offensive Speech, and the Approach of the European Court of 
Human Rights”, 248.  
39 Discussion of this goes beyond the subject of this article. 
40 Erbakan v Turkey, at [68]. 
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what the three dissenters stated in Féret v Belgium.41 These three dissenters expressed 
their opinion that there had been a violation of Féret’s freedom of expression under 
article 10 but the four majority judges concluded that there had not.  
Therefore, the European Court of Human Rights itself is not very clear about the 
meaning of ‘fostering intolerance’. In Féret v Belgium, the judges were divided over 
this issue, while Erbakan v Turkey, appears to suggest that the dissenters in Féret v 
Belgium are right and that real impact, present risk and imminent danger of violence 
needs to be established rather than a mere ‘fostering intolerance’. An example of an 
expression of intolerance that has real impact would be a speech inciting hatred and 
violence where actual violence was likely to follow, where there was a present risk and 
imminent danger of violence.  
It is submitted that expressions should not be restricted just because they foster 
intolerance and that the European Court of Human Rights should require real impact, 
present risk or imminent danger, because any other interpretation would allow states to 
curtail (political) speech based on a hypothetical and unsubstantiated danger of fostering 
intolerance. As Buyse writes, the dissenters in Féret v Belgium 
pointed out the difference between incitement--with direct effect--and the long 
term consolidation of prejudice and intolerance. Such potential future dangers 
should not be presented as an apocalyptic scenario which warrants limits on 
freedom of expression in the present. To do so would limit free political debate 
                                                 
41 Féret v Belgium, dissenting opinion. See also: A. Buyse, “Dangerous Expressions: the ECHR, Violence 
and Free Speech” (2014) 63(2) I.C.L.Q. 491, 499. 
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and deny the power of counter-arguments and the independent formation of 
opinions.42  
Therefore, fostering intolerance is too vague a term which is too open to a very wide 
interpretation and just fostering intolerance should not be sufficient to restrict the 
freedom of expression of politicians without evidence of imminent risk or present 
danger. 
V CHILLING EFFECT 
Based on the above, it is submitted that a politician’s expression should not be restricted 
just because it offends the religious feelings of some people or fosters intolerance 
without evidence of real impact. The European Court of Human Rights should thus 
scrutinize restrictions imposed on the freedom of speech of politicians very strictly and 
this freedom should not be limited to protect the right of others unless real impact on 
society can be demonstrated. This real impact can only be established when the 
expression constitutes a present risk or imminent danger of violence or, when the 
expression factually stops people from holding, manifesting or practising their religion. 
And, even then, this is still subject to the justification test in article 10(2) ECHR and 
thus the European Court of Human Rights should carefully examine whether the means 
used to achieve the aim of protecting public safety or the rights of others are 
proportionate and necessary. 
                                                 
42 Buyse, ibid. 499-500. 
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It is thus argued here that freedom of expression of politicians should not be 
restricted except in the very limited circumstances described above because of the 
crucial importance of an open debate in a democratic society. Allowing for wide 
restrictions on political speech, especially those involving the imposition of criminal 
sanctions, would have a ‘chilling effect’ on freedom of speech: it would lead to self-
censorship and stop people from expressing themselves and this would have serious 
effects on the public debate, especially if it stopped (opposition) politicians from 
speaking out. In Erbakan v Turkey, the European Court of Human Rights pointed out 
that the severe sanction imposed on the applicant in that case invariably produced a 
dissuasive effect.43 And, the Venice Commission underlined that  
it must be possible to criticise religious ideas, even if such criticism may be  
perceived by some as hurting their religious feelings. Awards of damages should 
be carefully and strictly justified and motivated and should be proportional, lest 
they should have a chilling effect on freedom of expression.44    
This chilling effect of restrictions on freedom of speech is exacerbated by the 
imposition of severe sanctions and this is why the severity of the sanction is also taken 
into account by the European Court of Human Rights when deciding whether an 
interference with a person’s freedom of expression is justified, as is clear from Erbakan 
v Turkey above. 
                                                 
43 Erbakan v Turkey, at [68]. This has also been stressed in relation to journalists, see, for example, 
Lingens v Austria, at [44] and Surek v Turkey (No 2) (1999) 7 B.H.R.C. 339, at [40]. 
44 European Commission for Democracy through Law, Report on the Relationship between Freedom of 
Expression and Freedom of Religion at [76]. 
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If expressing mere intolerance or offending certain people is enough to curtail 
expressions in the public debate, it would make it too easy for the state to stifle 
opposition. The European Court of Human Rights should thus not accept this as 
sufficient justification for restriction the freedom of expression of politicians and others 
and it should scrutinize national restrictions on such expressions very closely. If the 
Court does not do so, then, as Cram writes ‘there will be likely to be self-censorship on 
the part of commentators’.45 Boyle writes about the Danish cartoon controversy,46 and 
points out, that ‘few would challenge that there has been a vast expansion of self-
censorship in the media over Islam in the aftermath of the affair’.47  And Cram, also 
writing about the violent protests after the publication of these cartoons, expresses that, 
if the European Court of Human Rights does not scrutinize national restrictions on 
expressions about Islamic links to terrorist activity very strictly these ‘violent protests 
on behalf of those who have been “insulted” will have succeeded in creating a “chill” on 
freedom of expression that robs the public domain of a range of opinions concerning the 
links between religious fundamentalism and terrorism’.48  
                                                 
45 Cram, in Hare and Weinstein, 324. 
46 In 2005, a Danish newspaper published a series of cartoons of the prophet Muhammad and this led to 
violent protests and demonstrations by Muslims in Denmark and subsequently in other places around the 
world. See on this: Noorlander, “In Fear of Cartoons”, 117-119. 
47 K. Boyle, “The Danish Cartoons” (2006) 24 N.Q.H.R. 185, 189. 
48 Cram, in Hare and Weinstein, 324. 
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VI CONCLUSION 
The European Court of Human Rights has always stressed that freedom of expression is 
a fundamental and necessary right for the proper functioning of a democratic society 
because of the importance of open and public debate in such a society. This right is of 
particular importance to (opposition) politicians. The Court has afforded a very high 
level of protection to political speech and will thus scrutinize restrictions on this very 
carefully. Politicians can use offensive, shocking or disturbing language, can exaggerate 
and provoke, and be immoderate, controversial and virulent to get their views across 
because of their important contribution to the public and political debate. The Court has 
also held that speech criticizing religions or religious believers attracts the protection of 
article 10 ECHR. But this does not mean that states can never restrict the speech of 
politicians who use anti-Islam and anti-Muslim rhetoric. 
It has been argued that restrictions on the freedom of expression of politicians 
must be scrutinized very strictly by the European Court of Human Rights even if they 
concern religious issues. Anti-Islam or anti-Muslim speeches by politicians cannot be 
said to be ‘gratuitously offensive’ because they contribute to the very current public 
debates on immigration, integration and terrorism taking place all over Europe. These 
are issues that worry many people and politicians should be able to raise these in the 
public debate. The freedom of expression of politicians should thus not be restricted just 
because it is offensive to some people nor should it be curbed because it merely fosters 
intolerance. It should not be limited to protect public safety or the rights of others unless 
real impact on society can be demonstrated because the expression constitutes speech 
with an imminent risk or present danger that violence will occur, or, because the 
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expression factually stops people from holding, manifesting or practising their religion. 
And, even then, the justification test from article 10(2) ECHR applies. Because of the 
crucial importance of an open public and political debate for a democratic society and 
because of the chilling effect restrictions and sanctions can have, only in these very 
limited circumstances should a state be allowed to restrict the freedom of expression of 
politicians and the European Court of Human Rights should always scrutinize such 
restrictions extremely carefully. Such expressions should not be restricted merely 
because they are offensive to some people. Indeed, much political speech might, by its 
nature, be offensive to opponents. 
 
